Survey of Impact of “CME Database” Pilots and Non-consensual Datasharing from Healthcare Sources on Welsh Home Educators



Introduction


This survey was designed to evaluate the impact of pilots of “CME databases” that the Welsh Government have been running in one-third of Welsh local authority regions over the last year.
These database mechanisms involve sharing identifying data of children from NHS healthcare sources without knowledge or consent of children or parents, with councils.
The purpose of those databases was given as identification of children by the council so that they can consider whether they are home educated or missing education, although the Welsh government subsequently claimed that these database pilots and the associated mechanisms would not relate to or impact home educated children or young people. (More can be read on this here).


This pilot has not yet concluded. However, for reasons that they have not disclosed, the Welsh Government brought forward the publication of their commercially commissioned evaluation of these “CME database” pilots to coincide with the closing days of the present Senedd term.

We were aware that no home educators had been allowed to be involved in the evaluation of the impact of these pilots.

We were also aware of the highly questionable methodology, content and extrapolations of the evaluation of their EHE guidance that the Welsh Government had commissioned from the same commercial company, which was published only weeks before.

We therefore undertook this brief survey of lived experiences of those impacted by the methods used in these CME database pilots, including of related experiences of non-consensual datasharing. This ongoing study was conducted urgently because of concerns of uncertainty of why publication of that evaluation had been brought forwards within the closing days of the present Senedd term, including concerns of triggering of policy enactments without full evaluation of risks, impacts and consequences of these,  without engagement with the community, with experts in ethics, or with clinicians and professional medical bodies.

Methodology


A survey including multiple choice questions and numerous opportunities for free text written responses was developed, to allow production of quantitative and qualitative data. The range of questions were drawn from a spectrum of suggestions and concerns expressed in a variety of home education groups. The survey used Google Forms and was circulated via a range of Welsh national and local home education groups.

Due to time limitations, with the publication of the Welsh government’s evaluation being brought forwards to days before the close of Senedd business, this is an initial release of results from the first 4 days of the survey, as of 25th March 2026.

Responses were fully anonymised, with no collection of email or IP addresses.


Demographics of Respondents.


24 responses were obtained over a 4-day period. These were generally experienced home educators, with the duration of their home education experience demonstrated in Figure 1.


13 out of 24 respondents lived in areas where the council is participating in Welsh Government’s “CME database” pilots.

Results


Question 1: Results shown in Figure 2:

Nearly half of respondents did not know how the LA obtained their identifying data. Only 25% felt confident that they knew the source that had shared their identifying data.

Figure 2.

Part of the difficulty of evaluating the impact of these database pilots is the lack of transparency by the council and lack information for families to know if they were identified as part of the pilot or by other means.

However, it is reasonable to believe that the key impacts of being identified because of data being shared from healthcare sources without consent are likely tb be very similar and equally relevant whether information was shared as part of this “pilot” or not.

Question 2:

Respondents were invited to comment further on their understanding and experience of the likely source of their data.


Concerningly, several respondents stated that they were cold-called by those claiming to be council staff but who did not know the children’s names.
This included respondents within pilot areas where it was considered likely that they had been identified by the CME database pilot mechanisms, including where only one sibling in the family had been identified by that mechanism. This mirrors the observations in the WG-commissioned evaluation of these pilots  on the unreliability of source data used in such pilots.

It also demonstrates a significant safeguarding risk in terms of practice being established for it to be considered acceptable or normal to respond to strangers coldcalling and asking or “fishing” for information about children in this way


Some respondents, who lived in areas where the pilot schemes are running, were aware that they were identified because of this, although they were not necessarily told this by council staff.
For example they had to submit freedom of information requests to establish this, or they concluded that this appeared likely to be the source, having learnt about these pilot schemes from home education groups, having not received any information on these pilot schemes from their council or from the Welsh Government.


Two of these responses were from respondents in the same pilot scheme area but where the respondents felt it was clinicians who were responsible for the breach in confidentiality.

Other responses indicating NHS sources for their data were from respondents who do not live in pilot areas:

Health visitor for younger sibling (not pilot area)

4 responses raised the possibility of non-NHS sources having shared their data without consent, for example a Steiner school, even though the child was not of compulsory school age, or social services following a malicious referral that was found to have no basis.

Several respondents indicated they had no idea how they were identified as home educators by councils, comments included that the LA would not tell them where they had sourced their data from.


Questions 3 and 4: impact on trust in councils and healthcare


The damage to trust in both council and healthcare staff by such datasharing was clearly evident, as demonstrated in Figures 3 and 4

Figure 3: impact of non-consensual datasharing from healthcare sources with councils on capacity to trust councils.

Figure 4: Impact of non-consensual datasharing from healthcare sources with councils on capacity to trust healthcare providers.  


Question 5: impact of data being shared from healthcare

Respondents were asked:
If time permits, please explain your experience and feelings further in relation to your family’s data being share from healthcare sources with the LA.

The extensive responses can be most simply appreciated by consideration of phrases such as:

very upset


Questions 6, 7 and 8: how council staff made initial contact:


Question 6, Figure 5:


Question 7, Figure 6:

On over half of occasions, council staff chose initial modes of contact that would put families “on the spot”, rather than modes of contact such as email and letters that allowed time and opportunity to consider appropriate response.

Such unexpected modes of contact were received (by opening the door or taking the phone call) in 64.3% of cases.

It is noteworthy that all other cases, the council staff were equally able to make contact with the family. In person visits or unexpected cold-calling phone calls are demonstrated to not be necessary to establish contact with families.

Question 8: experiences and impact of initial unexpected contact, including the mode of contact chosen by the LA.

Responses included:

Absolutely disgusting that they thought my child was missing in education

Two responses indicated that the initial contact was significantly less distressing and more acceptable when made by email rather than by cold-calling.

For example:


Question 9, Figure 7: Whether council staff explained the source of identifying data.


86.4% of respondents were not told by the council where they had sourced their identifying data from.

Figure 7:


Question 10: information given or not given by council staff on source of identifying data.

Some were not told the source, even on direct questioning. At least one respondent had to submit a freedom of information request to establish the source as being from the CME database pilot mechanisms. Two were told the source of their data was “confidential” or “anonymous”.

For example:

For example, council staff stating that the information had come from “doctors”.

Question 11: Figure 8 enquiries about educational provision.


Question 12, Figure 9: were children placed onto CME databases and if so, were families aware.


Even though no child was identified as missing education, as confirmed by Figure 8, it is notable from Figure 9 that that only 12.5% of respondents could feel reasonably confident in believing their child/children had not been placed onto these “CME” databases.

This relates to Welsh Government’s repeated attempt to give a different depiction to the meaning of CME and EHE from lawful definitions, in a manner to connote a role for the council that it does not lawfully have. This will be discussed later.

It should be noted that, according to the Schedule included in the consultation documents, a significant amount of personal information about the child, their education and their contacts would be expected to be stored on such databases.

Furthermore, only two respondents had been clearly told by the council that their children had been placed on these databases.

Question 13 Figure 9: lack of provision of information about the databases.

That concerning observation and criticism of the pilot is confirmed in Question 13 Figure 9, which demonstrates that no family were given any further information about the database mechanisms.


Question 14 Figure 10: lack of benefit for families of pilots and non-consensual datasharing.


The lack of benefit for children and families of non-consensual datasharing and the CME database pilot mechanisms was demonstrated in Question 14, Figure 10,

Where two thirds of respondents indicated being identified by the LA as home educators had been a negative experience, and no respondents found this to have been or become a positive experience.

Question 15: opportunity to comment further on the impacts of being identified by the LA as home educators.

These comments included:


Question 16 Figure 11: opportunity to identify safeguarding risks, particularly based on the experiences of those that had been impacted.


These results are also depicted in table form for clarity.

Opportunity was given to comment on other forms of safeguarding risks that respondents may feel or have found to be relevant to the CME database mechanisms.

These included:

  • Dangers of false reports being made against a family.
  • Concerns at what the data would be used for
  • There were further comments on the impact on confidence in accessing healthcare. For example:

The mechanism was considered to

with one respondent commenting that it was

ironically but also with relevance adding that


Question 17 Figure 12: Complaints

Only 17.5% of respondents had not considered making a complaint about the process of database mechanisms.

Further comments on whether or not people had decided to complaints in relation to CME databases and/or related issues with their data being shared with the council included: Concerns about “tracking” of families and “discrimination” in the subsequent use of the data, with several respondents referring to “lack of trust” in the council in relation to these database mechanisms.

Further discussion and observations


The CME database mechanisms being used to identify responsible home educators who had quite lawfully not informed the council of their families’ mode of education, rather than being an efficient, safe or appropriate tool to identify children who are CME, is exactly what home educators anticipated the effect, and indeed the reason, of these databases to be.

This is exactly what home educators anticipated the effect, and indeed the reason of these databases to be, namely to be an attempt to monitor and oversee law-abiding responsible families.


Ms Neagle’s department repeatedly claimed, especially during the consultation process for CME databases, that these databases mechanisms did not relate to home education. However, it is clear from the design of the mechanisms as well as from previous statements including former Cabinet Secretaries for Education that these were designed to identify home educating families.


The Welsh Government have repeatedly attempted to use these CME databases to convey incorrect definitions of “CME” and home educated, implying that children are only home educated if the council know that they are and approve of this. That is not the legal status, home education is the default setting, with parents needing to opt out of this to proactively register a child in a school should they choose to do so. Should families choose to deregister a chid from school to be home educated, the documentation codes used are for home education, not for CME.


A further example of the misleading definitions of CME and EHE that the Welsh Government have sought to convey was noted in the recent comments of the present Cabinet Secretary for Education to the Children, Young People and Education Committee.

In that meeting, Ms Neagle also referred to the pilots of those “CME databases” as “particularly challenging”, interestingly commenting that this was “what we thought it might” be.

Concerningly however, she stated she was “looking forward” to the evaluation that she says is under way at present, stating that, despite the challenges, she intends “to see how we could take that work forward”.

Note the use of the term “how,” not “if”.

When considering the modes of initial contact chosen by council staff it is helpful to compare and consider not only the feelings expressed by the respondents to this survey, but also those expressed by another recently conducted survey of the experiences of Welsh Home Educators in relation to LA conduct, alongside the views expressed by council staff in the Welsh Government commissioned evaluation of their EHE guidance.

That survey demonstrated the detrimental and counterproductive impacts of cold-calling and doorstepping by council staff, which contrasts to the perceptions of council staff of how families consider such cold-calling, as stated in the WG-commissioned evaluation of their guidance.


The observations of lack of transparency, accuracy and accountability, as demonstrated in this survey, alongside a recent survey of the general experiences of home educators in relation to LA conduct and WG policy, run counter to the principles of GDPR and good practice in data management.

It is difficult for families to challenge any inaccuracies in databases such as these CME databases, if they are not even informed their children are or were on these, let alone permitted to see what is stored on such databases.

It is also notable that, as for any other areas of council policy or practice in relation to home education, there are no independent complaints, appeals, mediation, advocacy or tribunal services or mechanisms to address problems with policy or staff conduct in relation to home educated families.


The Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) for the CME database mechanisms was only published after the consultation was closed. The DPIA contains numerous misleading comments and points that require constructive criticism, too many to list here. A critique and rebuttal of this DPIA is presently being drafted.

This survey also highlights a range of risks to the safety and wellbeing of children in Wales of the use of such mechanisms, risks that were not addressed in the WG-commissioned evaluation of these.
These risks and consequences were however raised in the many responses to the consultations on these measures, including by professional bodies as well as those with lived experience,
but the Welsh Government chose to overlook these warnings.

This is somewhat ironic, given the present Cabinet Secretary’s previous comments in the Senedd that

The unreliability of data used by council staff in these CME database pilots, as noted in areas of this survey, is mirrored in the WG-commissioned evaluation of these pilots.

A key concern of those who had attempted to warn the Welsh Government of the risks, damage and consequences of these pilot databases was, given how clearly unworkable these pilots appeared to be, which has now been verified by the WG commissioned evaluation of them,

that the underlying motivation for persisting in enacting legislation to undertake these was not so much to identity children who are allegedly CME,

but rather as an opportunity to introduce and then normalise datasharing from confidential NHS sources for non-healthcare purposes.

It would obviously be inappropriate to take any further action in relation to any aspects of these CME database pilots until there has been full evaluation of the impacts, risks, consequences and experiences of those affected, as well as input into the ethical implications and repercussions on clinician-patient relationships of non-consensual data-sharing from healthcare sources.